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ABSTRACT 
Federalism, Reapportionment and Innovation: 
The Case of Agricultural Research and Extension 
Susan Rose-Ackerman and Robert Evenson 
This paper seeks to identify the economic and political factors 
that produce state financial support for agricultural research and 
extension. We hypothesize that the state demand for research and 
extension services is influenced not only by an interest in generating 
social benefits but also by the size and political effectiveness of 
farm interests and by the federal structure of government. Although 
basic measures of farm income and population are a key determinant of 
spending patterns, measures of intergovernmental influence are also 
empirically important. Federal grants have "price" effects which 
stimulate spending; the reapportionment of state legislatures mandated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court had a negative effect, while the ability of 
farmers to elect other farmers to the legislature raises state support 
for research and extension. In general, we conclude that given 
current trends in political and economic conditions, the downward 
trend in the relative importance of agricultural Rand D spending 
appears likely to continue in spite of the high marginal rate of 
return to such research. 
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I. Introduction 
Empirical studies of the rate of return to publicly supported 
agricultural research and extension show consistently high rates, 
.. 
generally above 20% per year. 1 These results prompt an economist to 
ask why the investment is not higher. State and federal governments 
do not appear to be maximizing the sum of producers' and consumers' 
surplus. We hypothesize, instead, that the demand for research and 
extension services is influenced not only by an interest in generating 
social benefits but also by the size and political effectiveness·of 
farm interests and by the federal structure of government••2 While 
the supply of research and extension services may depend on the prices 
of human and other resources and on the stock of potentially worth­
while ideas, it is also determined by the availability of federal 
grants and of spill-in technology. In addition state spending may be 
affected by laws and court decisions at the national level which 
preempt state choices and affect ·the balance of political influence 
within a state. The major example here is the reapportionment of 
state legislatures mandated by the Supreme Court in 1962. This 
judicial decision is widely believed to have reduced the relative 
influence of farm and rural interests. Our research is an advance 
over work which looks separately at any one of these influences. For 
example, research on reapportionment has seldom directly studied 
programs of interest to farmers and has not assessed the impact of 
federal grants (see Saffell, 1982, 204-210). Conversely, research on 
federal grants has not been concerned with the impact of reapportion­
ment on state spending decisions (see e.g., Gramlich, 1977). 
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Section II of the paper lays out the basic conceptual framework 
and discusses our data base. Section III presents the research 
£indings. We show that the overall importance of farming to a state 
measured both in terms of income and population partially determines 
spending patterns. However, political structure and federal grants 
also influence budgetary decisions. We find that the reapportionment 
in the 1960s, which reduced rural "over-representation," had a nega­
tive effect on state support for research and extension spending. We 
also find that Federal grants play an independent role in affecting 
state spending. Although federal grants have no real marginal price 
effect in most states, budget setters act as if grants reduce the 
marginal cost of services. In addition, if farmers are able to elect 
other farmers to the legislature,this is associated with higher levels 
of state support for agricultural research and extension. Finally, 
"spill-ins" of research results from other states appear to have a 
negative effect on livestock research but are unimportant for crop 
research. 
II. The Basic Framework 
A. The Interests of Farmers and Consumers 
Most agricultural technology lowers costs and shifts supply 
curves rightward. With easy entry and few specialized factors, prices 
tend to fall with average costs (Hayami and Ruttan, 1975; Evenson, 
1982: Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978). This suggests that, so long as 
promising research projects are available, consumers should be the 
major interest group supporting research and extension and implies 
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that they would lobby for federal rather than state support. It 
appears, however, that consumer groups are relatively weak supporters 
3
of research and extension at both the state and federal level. 
In contrast, farm producer groups actively lobby state govern­
ments for research and extension funds. This behavior ceases to be 
anomalous once one recognizes that most agricultural technology 
produced by public sector experiment stations can only be used under 
certain geoclimatic conditions. Many crops which are close substi­
tutes for consumers are grown under very different supply conditions. 
Research which improves the productivity of Hard Red Spring wheat 
grown in Minnesota, for example, may be of little or no use to Hard 
Red Winter wheat farmers in Oklahoma. Farm groups in a particular 
state with localized growing conditions may thus earn "rent" by 
supporting research and extension. This will be the case if a state's 
farmers provide only a small share of total market output and if their 
growing conditions are very idiosyncratic. Of course, the rent will 
be eroded by the research and extension support programs of other 
states, but the erosion is independent of the state's own invest-
4ment. 
The location specificity of agricultural technology is, however, 
not neatly associated with state political boundaries. Most new 
technology produced by a particular state will "spill-in" to other 
states with similar soil and climate conditions. Thus "free-riding" 
is possible for producer groups in states which receive technology 
from outside (cf. Ruttan, 1982a). It is not obvious, however, that 
spill-ins will reduce the demand for state supported research. 
Although direct transfers are possible in some cases, in other sit-
-6-
uhions the borrowed research is not useful unless it has been incor­
porated into the state's own research program and adapted to local 
conditions. To capture these effects for each state we have measures 
of the investment in research by states in similar geoclimatic region 
based on work done by Evenson (1978). We calculated separate spill-in 
measures for crops (SPCROP) and livestock (SPLVSTK). (See Appendix 1 
for detailed definitions.) 
In short, the multiplicity of state governments combined with 
variable geoclimatic conditions helps to explain farmers' support for 
research and extension. While some borrowing is possible and may work 
to reduce support, we hypothesize that it will not outweigh farmers' 
other interests in higher state research budgets. This is especially 
likely to be so because farmers do not directly bear much of the cost 
of financing the state experiment stations and the extension service. 
B. Empirical Specification 
1. Dependent Variables 
We do not believe that it is possible to develop a plausible 
model of state politics in which nthe government;; maximizes a utility 
function subject to constraints or makes majoritarian choices reflect­
ing the preferences of the median voter. The political system is 
simply too complex to be captured in this way. We do, however, 
believe that a range of exogenous political economic variables will 
have a marginal impact on the share of a state's budget spent on 
5
agricultural research and extension. We proceed, therefore, to 
specify reduced form relationships between measures of state spend­
ing, treated here as endogenously determined by states, and several 
economic and political variables that affect supply and demand. In 
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tJ-is section the motivation for including each variable is explained. 
They are defined precisely in Appendix 1 which also reports their 
means and standard deviations. 
We examine research and extension spending separately. Budgetary 
choices may differ for these two related programs because the politi­
cal support for each is somewhat different and because separate 
federal subsidies cover each program. Research projects, involving 
the search for new crop varieties and production techniques, may take 
several years to produce useful results. Therefore, research may be 
most strongly supported by relatively large farmers with a consider­
able capital investment and a long-term perspective. Such farmers may 
have less demand for public extension service if they are highly 
skilled managers and large purchasers of private extension services. 
In contrast, the public extension services which disseminate research 
results to farmers may be of relatively greater benefit to smaller, 
poorer farmers. Therefore, we expect that farm income will be rela­
tively strongly associated with research while farm population will be 
more strongly associated with extension. 
We use state data for the agricultural census years 1959, 1964, 
1969, 1974 and 1978 and estimate two related specifications for 
research spending and for extension spending. The first takes total 
state appropriations as a share of the budget as the dependent vari­
able (STRS/SB and STEXT/SB for research and extension respectively). 
This specification assumes that states choose a level of overall 
appropriations on the basis of state economic and political charac­
teristics and federal grants. The second attempts to explain excess 
state spending over the amount required to match federal grants 
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(XSTRS/SB and XSTEXT/SB for research and extension). This second 
formulation assumes that state political choices focus on spending not 
required for matching purposes. 
To see how the two types of de­
pendent variables are related, suppose that an increase in federal 
grants of one dollar induces an increase of 75 cents in state appro­
priations. Suppose that the matching rate is 50% so that every dollar 
of federal money must be matched by a dollar of state money. Then if 
total state appropriations increase by 75 cents, excess spending, not 
required to satisfy matching requirements, falls by 25 cents. In 
making our estimates we impose this restriction on the federal grant 
coefficients. 
We make a moderately strong assumption about the link between 
spending on research and extension and the total state budget. The 
dependent variables are defined as shares of the total state budget. 
Since total state spending is closely related to state income, we 
include total personal income of the state (TPY) as an independent 
variable. We hypothesize that the share of the budget expended on 
agricultural research and extension is related to a set of economic 
and political variables and to the total personal income of the state. 
However, the overall budget is assumed to be more income elastic than 
appropriations for agricultural Rand D. Thus an increase in state 
income should reduce the budget share of agricultural research and 
extension •. 
2. Farm Income and Population Variables 
We expect that states with higher farm income and population 
shares (NFY/TPY and FPOP/TPOP respectively) will spend a higher 
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proportion of their budgets for both research and extension. The 
interpretation of a significant positive coefficiant is difficult, 
however. Ceteris paribus the benefits to a state of its agricultural 
research and extension activity will be larger if farm income and 
population are high. Alternatively, if farmers are an important 
source of a state's income and a substantial fraction of the 
population, we might expect them to be an effective political force 
capable of obtaining high levels of public research and extension 
spending. The relative size of the farm population is a proxy for 
their voting strength. Farm income, through campaign contributions 
and other favors, may also translate into political influence. 
3. Measures of Farmers' Political Influence 
Although we have not been able to examine the explicit mechanisms by 
which farm income and population affect research and extension spend­
ing, we have tried to capture farmers' political influence more 
carefully than previous work. We were aided in this effort by the 
availability of data stretching back to 1958 and by an important 
structural change in state political systems that occurred during the 
1960s. In 1962 the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
226 (1962), decided that both houses of a state's legislature must be 
apportioned so that each district contained approximately the same 
number of voters. Before this decision went into effect as few as 12% 
of the voters in some states could elect 50% of the members of one 
6house of the State legislature. When this proportion is low, rural 
voters are generally overrepresented in the legislature. By the end 
of the sixties about 50% of the population was needed to elect 50% of 
7the legislature in all states. Thus the Supreme Court decision 
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makes it possible to distinguish between political power determined by 
numbers and wealth irrespective of the particular structure of the 
political system and influence that depends upon favorable institu­
tional arrangements. We have two ways to capture the impact of 
reapportionment. First of all we have a measure of the share of the 
population needed to control the state legislature (PCNTC). Second, 
since the reapportionment decision occurred in the middle of our data 
set, we can see whether rural overrepresentation aided farm interests 
in the earlier period. Thus, we have defined a dummy variable (APP) 
which equals one if a data point is from the post-apportionment period 
and zero otherwise. We interact this dummy with both the farm income 
and population variables and expect that for the post-apportionment 
period population will have more influence and income less. 
For the most recent years we have another explicitly political 
variable: the proportion of legislators who list farming as their 
occupation (PCFRMR). The proportion ranged from Oto 47% in 1975 with 
a mean of 10.4% (Insurance Information Institute, 1976). Of course, a 
simple vote maximizing model of politicians; behavior implies that a 
person's occupation ought to be irrelevant to the policies he or she 
espouses. Legislators simply vote in the way that will maximize their 
chance of reelection. However, if one assumes that voters do not take 
much time to find out about candidates' positions, then occupation may 
be important. Voters might suppose that if a candidate is labeled a 
"farmer", he will look out for farmers' interests better than a lawyer 
or an insurance agent. Occupational classification is a kind of 
signal to voters indicating the candidate's policy positions. If this 
view is plausible, the proportion of legislators who are farmers is a 
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measure of farmers' ability to elect people to state office who are 
willing to work for agricultural interests. Since we would expect 
PCFRMR to depend on the proportion of farm income and farm population 
in a state, we regressed PCFRMR on NFT/TPY and FPOP/TPOP for the 1969-74-78 
data sets and entered the residual in the regressions 
(RESFMRS). 8 
We also have one measure of farmers' organizing ability: member­
ship in marketing coops divided by the number of commercial farms 
(MCOOP). Farmers, already organized to market their products, might 
use these cooperatives to lobby public officials. This variable may 
not, however, be a purely political measure. A strong cooperative 
movement in a state may also facilitate the introduction of new 
technology and thus increase the benefits of research. 
Finally, some work by political scientists suggests that the 
civil war left the southern states with a different political struc­
ture and culture than the rest of the country. Thus some empirical 
work on state politics includes a dummy variable for the southern 
states to take account of these differences. This, 
of course, amounts to an admission of ignorance. If one understood 
why the south is special, one could capture these distinctive charac­
teristics explicitly. To find out if we too have omitted important 
southern regional characteristics we also include a southern dummy 
variable (SOUTH). Product mix might, however, be more important than 
region. Perhaps crop farmers are on balance a more effective political 
force than livestock farmers. Thus we include a variable measuring 
the share of agricultural output accounted for by crops (CSHARE). 
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4. Intergovernmental Grants 
Subtle interstate differences in political structure and marginal 
benefits may, however, be swamped by the overwhelming effect of 
Federal grant programs. Thus we include measures of Federal grants as 
a share of the total state budget (FEDRS/SB and FEDEXT/SB for research 
and extension respectively). 
Federal funds are important, accounting for between one quarter 
and one third of total research spending and about 40% of extension 
spending. Given a matching rate of about 50%, 
9 this implies that 
only about one-third to one-half of all research dollars and about 20% 
of extension dollars are freely allocated by states over and above the 
required matching share. 
10 Since the grants are closed-ended and 
since most states spend more than their matching share, a marginal 
increase in federal dollars would have an income effect but no price 
effect if governments responded as if they were rational individual 
consumers. There is little reason to suppose, however, that models of 
individual behavior can be applied uncritically to studies of govern-
ment actions. In fact, evidence from ether public prngram~ nne~ nn~ 
support such analogies. Most of these studies show that governments 
respond as if lump sum grants reduced the per unit price of the public 
11service. This so-called "flypaper" effect (i.e., "money sticks 
where it hits") has been explained in terms of a money illusion 
12
de1 i.berate1y perpetuatedby budget maxi miz· i ng po1·it i cians.· 
Suppose that the cost of one unit of public service is $1 and that the 
federal government gives the state government a lump sum grant of R. 
If total state spending on this service is B, then proponents of this 
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-theory hypothesize that voters believe that the tax cost of an extra 
unit is B;R which is less than the actual cost of $1. The larger 
is R, the smaller is this perceived tax cost, and the more of the 
service people want. Unless the income elasticity of demand for the 
service is very high, a grant to the government will generate more 
spending on the service than an equivalent grant given directly to the 
population. 
5. Estimation Procedures 
We estimate two alternative four equation systems utilizing the 
Zellner (1962) seemingly unrelated procedure. Actually our results 
are very close to OLS estimates since the only independent variables 
which differ in the equations are the federal funds variables 
(FEDRS/SB in the research equations and FEDEXT/SB in the extension 
equations.) We also imposed a restriction across the two research 
equations (STRS/SB and XSTRS/SB) and the two extension equations 
(STEXT/SB and XSTEXT/SB) which forced the federal funds coefficients 
13to be consistent in both equations. 
We report two versions of the statistical model to illustrate two 
alternative approaches to measuring a reapportionment effect (Table 
1). The first version relies on the PCNTC (percent necessary to 
control) variable to measure a reapportionment effect. The second 
version interacts the post-apportionment dummy variable (APP) with 
farm income (NFY/TPY), farm population (FPOP/TPOP) and federal grants 
(FEDRS/SB, FEDEXT/SB) to estimate shifts in the effects of these 
variables which can be arguably attributed to reapportionment. Since 
RESFMRS is only available for recent years, we also estimated equa­




Our results (Tables 1 and 2) help to distinguish between the 
influence of the federal structure of government, the political 
organization of farmers, and basic measures of their numbers and 
income. Clearly, much of the interstate variation in states' spending 
can be explained with no help from measures of government structure or 
$he\..'<""'{.. 
federal grants.A high farm in~omev(NFY/TPY) is linked to high budget 
shares for research while the farm population share (FPOP/TPOP) is a 
significant determinant of extension spending. In contrast, income is 
a much less important determinant of extension spending, and popu­
lation has no significant impact on research spending. 14 These 
results are consistent with the idea that agricultural research is of 
more direct benefit to farmers in proportion to their income while 
extension benefits are proportional to the size of the farm popu­
lation. Therefore, they suggest that interstate differences in 
spending are tied to interstate differences in benefits. 
However, the results also imply that it is not enough simply to 
know how important farming is in a state. The regressions indicate 
that political structure affects state choices. First, consider 
legislative apportionment. The results in equations (2), (4), (6), 
(8) in Table 1 support our predictions about the impact of reappor­
tionment especially for research. Although farm population fell over 
this period as a share of the total population, on the margin its 
impact increased. For extension, the main impact is on "excess" state 
spending where the coefficient on the farm income share falls to 20% 
.. 
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of its preapportionment value and the coefficient on the farm popu­
lation share more than doubles. (There was, of course, also a large 
shift in the elasticities. See Table 3.) 
Another way of looking at the impact of state legislative appor­
tionment is through PCNTC which measures the percent of the population 
needed to elect 50% of the legislature. ln 1964 the mean of PCNTC was 
.32 with a range of .12 to .48. By 1969, after reapportionment, the 
mean was .48 with a range of .45 to .52. This variable helps explain 
interstate differences in research appropriations although the signif­
icance level is not very high. The higher the level of rural over­
representation in state legislatures (the lower is PCNTC), the higher 
the budget share. Apparently, reapportionment has reduced farmers' 
power to affect the level of research spending. 
Second, we examine two variables which measure the ability of 
farmers to organize to pursue their interests. One, membership in 
marketing cooperatives (MCOOP), is insignificant. This casts doubt on 
anecdotal testimony which emphasizes the power of the cooperative 
movement as well as on the results of Guttman (1978) and Huffman and 
Miranowski (1981). In contrast, we have employed a new variable which 
does have a high level of explanatory power for both research and 
extension. For recent years, we know whether farmers were particular­
ly successful in electing other farmers to the legislature (RESFMRS). 
An increase in this variable implies added support for farm programs 
15(Table 2). 
Third, the results for the full data set suggest that states do 
try to free ride off the research of others especially for livestock 




Apparently, the possibility of borrowing others' livestock 
research does not require states to spend much to adapt this research 
to local conditions. Even without direct evidence on productivity, 
this free riding suggests that the overall level of spending will be 
inefficiently low. 
Finally, federal grants appear to have an important "price" 
effect on state appropriations. Almost all states spend more than 
their required matching share. Therefore, on the margin the state 
government should treat the grant like a lump sum grant. Analytically 
the subsidy is no different from an untied cash grant from the Federal 
government. Since agricultural research and extension spending each 
average about one quarter of one percent of a state's budget, it seems 
plausible to assume that a $1 ·increase in a state's income would 
produce only a very small increase in total spending on these programs 
even if the income elasticity of demand for the programs were large. 
Thus if the marginal increase in grants were treated in this way, 
state appropriations on agricultural research and extension (STRS, 
STEXT) would fall by almost one dollar. If the coefficient on federal 
grants in the state appropriations equation were almost minus one 
dollar, "excess" spending would fall by two dollars (one dollar to 
match the federal grant and one dollar to be spent elsewhere). The 
results do not support this view of the marginal effect of grants. 
Although on the margin they are "really" untied lump sum grants, 
governments appear to treat these funds as if they lowered the 
marginal cost of agricultural research and extension. It is not clear 
why this happens, but it is consistent with other research showing 
that Federal money "sticks where it hits." In fact, the result is 
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stronger than this. Not only does the Federal money stay in agricul­
tural research and extension but it also seems to stimulate state 
spending. The closed-ended matching grants appear to have price 
effects even when the matching share is exceeded. Instead of being 
close to minus one, the coefficients on federal funds are positive. 
They are .15 for research and .75 for extension (thus excess research 
spending falls by 85 cents and excess extension spending falls by 25 
17
cents). In recent years the price effects are even stronger 
especially for research. (See row (7) in Table 1 which reports the 
18
coefficient on (APP)*(FEDRS/SB)). 
Table 3 summarizes our estimates in the form of elasticities 
computed at data means. These elasticities not only summarize our 
estimates but also suggest implications for the future growth in 
spending. The effects of the variables PCNTC (reapportionment), 
SPLVSTK (spill-in), and CSHARE (crop share in output) are unlikely to 
change very much in the next decade or so. Reapportionment, of 
course, had the additional effect of shifting the basic support base 
for both research and extension away from farm income ~nrl ~nu~rrl f~rm 
population. However, even if farm population were to grow at the same 
rate as farm income in the future, both state research and state 
extension spending would fall as a proportion of state budgets. The 
sum of the post-apportionment elasticities is consistently less than 
one. 
-~--------------------------------~---~-------------------~--------------------~~---~--~-----~-~----------------
Table 1. Regression Estimates: Full Data Set:. 
Inde;eendent De;eendent Variables 
Variables STRS/SB XSTRS/SB STEXT/SB XSTEXT/SB 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept .236 .172 .311 .240 .168 .160 .216 .172 
(3.90) (2.70) (5 .12) (3.76) (3.18) (2. 88) (4.10) (3.12) 
(l)TPY -.0020 -.0013 -.0028 -.0022 -.0011 -.0010 -.0019 -.0002 
(3.65) (2.47) (5.29) (4.07) (2.46) (2 .17) (4.32) (3.89) 
(2)NFY/TPY 1.465 1.976 1.784 2.126 -.017 •719 .514 .968 
(6.61) (5.06) (8.04) (5.43) ( .09) (2.08) (2.61) (2.82) 
(3) (2)* APP - -.996 - -.815 - -1.01. - -.848 
(2.18) (1. 78) (2.51) (2.12) 
(4) FPOP/TPOP .151 -.150 .132 -.124 .468 .198 .629 .361 
(.89) (. 66) (.79) (. 54) (3.01) (. 9~,) (4. 06) (1. 72) 
(5) (4)*APP - .518 - .519 - .274 - .565 
(1.61) (1.61) (.90) ( 1. 86) 
I (6)FEDRS/SB! .154 .154 -.846 -.846 .752 •737 -.248 -.263 co 
r-1. FEDEXT/SB (1.58) (1.26) (8.70) (6. 87) (14.09) (11.73) (4.65) (4.19) 
(7) (6)*APP - .323 - .323 - .108 - .108 
(2.15) (2.15) (1.U') (1.17) 
(8) PCNTC -.179 -.146 -.223 -.186 -.083 -.075 -.80 -.037 
(1.56) (1.25) (1.95) (1.58) (.79) (. 71) (. 77) (.35) 
(9) MCOOP .Oll .013 .0010 .0019 -.003 -.0013 -.003 -.006 
(1.19) (1.39) (.11) (.20) ( .39) ( .16) ( .39) (. 74) 
(10) SPCROP -.0005 -.0005 -.0006 -.0005 -.0005 -.0005 -.0003 -.0002 
(1. 23) (1.07) (1.37) (1.21) (1.15) (1.20) (.39) (.62) 
(ll) SPLVSTK -.OOll -.0010 -.0013 -.0012 -.0007 -.0006 -.0008 -.0008 
(3.38) (3.01) (4.02) (3.68) (2.30) (2.20) (2.69) (2.78) 
(12) CSHARE .084 .101 ,039 .062 .005 -.002 -.048 -.037 
(2. 15) (2.57) (1.00) (1.57) (.13) ( .05) (1.41) (1.06) 
(13) SOUTH -.004 -.006 -.008 -.Oll -.035 -.038 .020 .014 
(. 25) ( .40) (.52) (.74) (2.35) (2.50) (1. 32) (.90) 
~· f 
(14) D59 -.062 -.016 -.069 -.15 -.017 -.om -.051 -.010 
- (2.41) ( .48) (2.72) ( .43) (. 74) (. 62) (2.20) (.34). (15) D64 -.026 .Oll -.022 .024 -.004 -.008 -.018 .016 
(1. 00) (.33) ( .84) (.74) ( .17) {. 28) {.80) ( .55) 
(16) D69 .022 .006 .056 .040 .012 .010 .017 .018 
(1. 16) (. 31) (2.87) (1.98) (.70) {.60) {. 99) (1.07) 
(17) D74 -.021 -.028 .027 .021 -.094 -.09'9 -.002 .0003 
(. 96) (1.19) {1.19) (.89) (4.56) (4.53) ( .08) (.02) 
Weighted R2 2for System .7841 .7886 .7841 .7886 .7841 .78:86 .7841. .7882 
t - statistics in parentheses 
2
1FEDRS/SB in (1), (2), (3), (4); FEDEXT/SB in (5), (6), (7), (8). 








Table 2 Regression Estimates: 1969, 1974, 1978 
IndeEendent Dependent Variables 
Variables STRS/SB XSTRS/SB STEXT/SB XSTEXT/SB 
Intercept -.102 -.059 .021 .074 
(3.39) (1. 97) (.78) (2.75) 
(l)TPY -.000003 -.0007 .0001 -.0006 
( .01) (1.52) (.30) (1.41) 
(2) NFY/TPY • 778 1.122 -.322 .129 
(3.56) (5. 22) (1.52) (.63) 
(3) FPOP/TPOP .391 .444 .267 .710 
(1.84) (2.12) (1.24) (3.37) 
(4)"FEDRS/SB .792 -.208 . 1.044 .044 
FEDEXT/SB1 (7 .82) (2.05) (14.08) ( .60) 
(5) RESFMRS 1.038 1.063 • 728 .549 
(6.94) (7 .23) (4.95) (3.83) 
(6) MCOOP .012 -.002 .0063 -.0015 
(1.23) (.17) (.68) ( .17) 
(7) SPCROP -.00002 -.0001 -.00001 -.0001 
(.06) ( .24) ( .02) ( .25) 
(8) SPLVSTK .0002 .00003 .0002 -.00007 
(.69) (.10) (. 76) (.25) 
(9) CSHARE .317 .279 .044 -.015 
(6.81) (6.09) (. 97) (.35) 
(10) SOUTH .044 .047 -.025 .030 
(2.61) (2.84) (1.42) (1.74) 
(11) D69 .035 .070 .023 .025 
(2.06) (4.19) (1.48) (1.63) 
(12) D74 .044 .094 -.091 -.0039 
(2.02) (4.42) (4.23) (.18) 
Weighted R2 
for System .5771 .5771 .5771 .5771 
FEDRS/SB in research regressions; FEDEXT/SB in extension 
regressions. 




Elasticities of Estimates in 1able 1 Computed at Data Means 
STRS/SB XSTRS/SB STEXT/SB XSTEXT/SB 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TPY -.09 -.06 -.21 -.17 -.05 -.04 -.15 -.16 
NFY/TPY .30 .61 .17 
PREAPP2 .41 • 72 .14 .33 
P0STAPP .20 .41 -.09 .04 
FP0P/TP0P .26 .38 
PREAPP .22 
P0STAPP .16 .25 .47 
FEDRS/SB .08 -.79 
PREAPP .09 -.79 
P0STAPP .26 -.44 
FEDEXT/SB .59 -.35.58 -.37 
.PCNTC -.65 -.54 
SPLVSTK -.09 -.08 -.17 -.16 -.05 -.04 -.11 -.11 
CSHARE .12 .15 .15 -= 12 
1Elasticities are only presented for variables whose parameters 
were significant.at a 10% level or better. 
2
PREAPP = pre-apportionment; P0STAPP = post-apportionment. 
The post-apportionment estimates use the means for the last 
three data sets. 
3 t = 1.25, slightly below 10% significance level. 
Table A2. Logarithmic Form Regressions - Full Data Set 
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IV. Implications for the Future 
The absolute level of real spending, state plus federal, for 
agricultural research and extension has been roughly constant for the 
past ten to fifteen years and spending relative to the value of 
agricultural product has declined by roughly 30 percent over this 
. d 19perio • Our results suggest that part of this relative decline is 
due to the fall in the share of farm income and farm population in 
state totals. Since this downward trend is likely to continue, Rand 
D spending cannot be expected to grow in real terms. Reapportionment 
may-have caused a one time decline in states with high farm income 
shares. The countervailing increase in the importance of farm popu­
lation in state spending decisions gives little grounds for optimism, 
however, since the farm population continues to fall as a share of the 
total. Thus unless federal funding for agricultural research and 
extension or total state budgets increase rapidly, the proportion of 
agricultural product invested in public sector research and extension 
will continue the decline which began about fifteen years ago. 
Neither possibility appears likely in the present political climate. 
Private sector research and extension has, however, increased over the 
period of our scudy. Since there are no adequate measures of these 
investments, however, we have been unable to incorporate them into our 
analysis. It is not obvious, however, that private agricultural 
suppliers will adequately make up for the relative decline in public 
20
spending. If the productivity measures are accurate, agricultural 
research and extension appears to be one area of government spending 
where a study of the marginal benefits would show that an increase 




The dependent variables are defined as follows: 
STRS/SB: State appropriations for agricultural research in 
thousands of dollars (STRS) divided by total state and local govern­
ment spending from own sources in hundreds of thousands of dollars 
(SB). Thus STRS/SB is one hundred times the budget share. We have 
included local revenues in SB to correct for arbitrary differences 
across states in the division of functions between levels of govern­
ment. In fact, the form of the revenue variable is likely to be 
unimportant. The alternatives we considered were all highly corre­
lated. State revenues from own sources in 1974, for example, has a 
correlation coefficient of .991 with SB. The source for SB is U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances. Sources for STRS are 
USDA Funds for Research and USDA, Cooperative State Research Service, 
Inventory of Agricultural Research. These sources are not completely 
compatible. Funds for Research was discontinued 1n 1975 and the CSRS 
data is available beginning with the i970 data set. In the results in 
the text, Funds for Research was used through 1974. Using CSRS data 
for 1970 and 1974 made only a minor difference in the results. 
XSTRS/SB: STRS minus an estimate of matching funds divided by 
SB. Discussion with officials at the USDA and study of the laws 
indicates that XSTRS can be approximated as: 
XSTRS/SB = (STRS - (Federal grants for research in thousands of 
dollars - 90))/SB. 
In other words, each state receives $90,000 and must match other grants 
dollar for dollar. See USDA Cooperative State Experiment Station Services 
(1962, pp. 219ff), and the laws cited in footnote 9. 
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STEXT/SB: State appropriations for agricultural extension in thou­
sands of dollars divided by SB. The numerator (STEXT) is calculated by 
subtracting federal grants from total state spending on extension. The 
source for total state spending is unpublished data from the USDA, Federal 
Extension Service. 
XSTEXT/SB: STEXT minus an estimate of matching funds divided by SB. 
USDA officials estimate that the share of grants requiring matching was 55% 
in 1978, 56% in 1974, and 74% in earlier years. (Conversation with Daniel 
Domingo, USDA Extension Service). 
Therefore, XSTEXT/SB = (STEXT - A*federal grants for research in thousands 
of $)/SB, 
where A= .55 in 1977 
A= .56 in 1974 
A= .74 in 1958, 1964, and 1969. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
NFY/TPY: Net Farm Income/Total Personal Income. (Source: U.S. Dept. 
of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.) 
•FPOP/TPOP: Farm Population/Total Population. Sources: U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Farm Population Estimates, 1910-1970, U.S.D.A. 
ESCS-86, August, 1980, and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Population Census. Farm population is defined as "all persons living in 
rural territory on places of 10 or more acres, if as much as $50 worth of 
agricultural products were sold from the place in the reporting year. It 
also includes those living on places of under 10 acres, if as much as $250 
worth of agricultural products were sold from the place in the reporting 
year." (P.6, U.S.D.A., ESCS-86). A new definition based on sales is being 
considered by the U.S.D.A., but is not reflected in the numbers used here. 
For 1974, the data for 1969 were used since state by state estimates are 
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not av"ailable after 1970. For 1979 the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
estimated the farm population in nine regions of the U.S. Thus farm 
population for the last data set was estimated by first calculating the 
share of each state in the farm population of its regional division in 
1970. This share was then multiplied by estimated farm population in the 
region in 1979 from U.S.D.A. publication ESCS-86, August, 1980. This 
procedure assumes that each state in a region lost farm population at the 
same rate as the region as a whole. 
CSHARE: The dollar value of crop output divided by the dollar value 
of all farm output (Source U.S.D.A., Census of Agriculture). 
TPY: Total Personal Income, in billions of constant dollars. The 
data are deflated by the GNP Deflator (1959=100). TPY is highly correlated 
with SB. Regressing SB in 1974 on TPY and total population (TPOP) in 
thousands (xl03) yields: 
SB= -1431 + 195TPY - .24TPOP 
(.63) (4.98) (.12) 
SPCR0P and SPLVSTK: Spill-in Research Stock. Cumulated research 
expenditures in billions of dollars (using information from Evenson 1978) 
on crop and livestock research, respectively, in similar geoclimatic 
regions in other states. Sixteen regions were defined from data published 
in the 1957 U.S.D.A. Yearbook of Agriculture. Each region was further 
divided into sub-regions. Studies by Evenson & Welch (1975) and Evenson 
(1978) concluded that crop research borrowing is primarily confined to 
similar subregions while livestock research borrowing is broader in scope 
and takes place across regions. 
FEDRS/SB: Federal Spending for agricultural research in thousands of 
dollars divided by SB. Measured as 100 times the budget share. (Source: 
U.S.D.A. CSRS, Inventory of Agricultural Research and unpublished data from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture). 
FEDEXT/SB: Federal spending on extension divided by SB. Measured as 
100 times the budget share. (Source: unpublished data from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Federal Extension Service). 
MCOOP: The number of farmers who are members of marketing coopera­
tives divided by the total number of commercial farms (i.e., farms selling 
proaucts valued at over $2500 per year). The cooperative variable is often 
greater than one (mean 1.4) because many farmers are members of several 
marketing cooperatives. Service coops are omitted because they frequent-
ly include a heterogeneous collection of farmers with few common political 
interests. (Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farmer Cooperative 
Service, Statistics of Farmer Cooperatives, and U.S. Department of Com­
merce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.). 
PCFRMR: The percentage of state legislators who list farming as their 
occupation. The mean of PCYRMR is .ii5. (Source: Insurance Information 
Institute (1976)). The data are only available for 1976 and 1978. For 
1969 and 1974 we used the 1976 data since this variable appears to be 
relatively stable from year to year for individual states. 
PCNTC: The share of the population needed to control the state 
legislature (PCNTC). Because this variable is available separately for 
each house of the state legislature, we averaged together the two shares. 
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Since a law must pass both houses and since the houses often differ widely 
in the number of members, this seemed to be a better procedure than using 
the percent needed to elect 50% of the total number of members. Source: 
Book of the States. 
A second apportionment measure (SMCTY) is available for the early 
years. For 1950 and 1960 Paul David and Ralph Eisenberg calculated the 
share of each state's legislature representing counties with less than 
25,000 people. If the people in these counties are heavily dependent upon 
agriculture for income and employment, this number is an alternative 
indicatio.n of "excess" agricultural political strength. (Source: David 
and Eisenberg, 1961). One would also expect this measure of farmers 
political strength to be associated with NFTPY and FRTPOP. A regression 
for the years 1954, and 1958 and 1964 indicates that this is so. (For 1964 
and 1958 the 1960 values for SMCTY were used and for 1954 we used the 1950 
data). The result was 
SMCTY = 121.37 + 1877.4 + 763.57 FRTPOP 
(4.78) (3.78) (2.46) 
Using the residuals of this regression in regressions involving only the 
preapportionment years showed that this variable had little explanatory 
power. 
Post-apportionment variables: APP= 1 if the data point is in the 
post-apportionment period (1969, 1974, 1978) and= 0 otherwise. This 
variable is multiplied by several other independent variables as a means of 
measuring reapportionment effects. 
A dummy variable (SOUTH) that equals one if the state is a Southern 
State. We use the U.S. Government's definition of the south. Thus SOUTH 
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equals one for the states: Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. 
Dummy variables for each of the data sets except 1978. 
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Table A-1 
Means and Standard Deviations 
Units All Data Sets 
Means Std.Dev. 
STRS/SB share x 100 .239 .145 
XSTRS/SB share x 100 .144 .119 
STEXT/SB share x 100 .259 .148 
XSTEXT/SB share x 100 .144 .096 
NFY1TPY share .049 .052 
FPOP/TPOP share .087 .073 
TPY Billion $ 11.16 13.59 
SPCR0P 20.28 14.78 
SPLVSTK 18.93 19.03 
MCOOP Members/Farm 1.34 .768 
CSHARE share .347 .189 
FEDRS/SB share x 100 .135 .091 
FEDEXT/SB share x 100 .204 .146 
PCNTC share .420 .090 
RESFMRS* share 






















Table A2 reports a logarithmic specification of the 
version one estimates reported in Table I. The only sub­
stantive differences in these estimates are a) the federal 
funds effect is lower, in fact negative for research and b) 
the free-riding effect on livestock research is less signif­
icant. We believe that the fact that a number of variables 
are expressed in share form in the linear specification 
argues against placing emphasis on the logarithmic form. 
Logarithms of small shares are more sensitive to errors than 
the shares themselves. Accordingly we believe that the 
basic linear specification discussed in the text is more 
appropriate. 
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Table A2. Logarithmic Functional Forms 
Dependent Variables 
-· Independent
Variables LN(STRS/SB) LN(XSTRS/SB) LN(STEXT/SB LN(XSTEXT/SB) 
Intercept -4.717 -6.089 -4 .471 -5.401 
(I) LN(TPY -.345 -.691 -.161 -.488 
(5.02) (5.90) (4.09) (6.95) 
(2) LN(NFY/TPY) .441 •725 .104 .150 
(8.35) (6.71) (2.50) (1.55) 
(3) LN(FPOP/TPOP) -.033 .019 .269 .795 
( .45) (.14) (4.09) (5.83) 
(4) LN(FEDRS/SB) -.245 -1.22 .137 -1.093 
LN(FEDEXT/SB) 1 (2.11) (6.64) (1.88) (8.57) 
(5) LN(PCNTC) -.180 -.391 .034 .034 
(1.23) (1.31) (.29) (.14) 
(6) LN(MCOOP) .049 .132 .002 .044 
(1.07) (1.42) (.06) ( .53) 
(7) LN(CSHARE) .091 .127 -.041 -.080 
(1.71) (1.16) (.97) ( .87) 
(8) SPCROP2 .00005 .0013 -.0007 .0017 
( .03) .32 (.42) ( .47) 
(9) SPLVSTK2 -.0007 .0006 -.0016 -.0016 
( .52) ( .21) (1.44) (.60) 
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(10) South .198 .218 .270 
(2.64) (1.45) (4.34) 
D59 -.232 -.490 -.068 
(2.40) (2.52) (.90) 
D64 -.063 -.083 .050 
(.63) (. 41) (. 63) 
D69 .129 .448 .062 
(1.31) (2.36) (.95) 
D74 -.08 .270 -.230 
(.74) (1.21) (2.51) 
2System R .8047 .8047 .8047 
t - statistics in parentheses. 
1 FEDRS/SB in research regressions; FEDEXT/SB in extension 
regressions. 
2 Not expressed in logs because of the existence of some zero 
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FOOTNOTES 
* This research was partially funded by the U.S. Department of 
. ' Agriculture. Ann Judd, Gary Moss, and Richard Whitten provided 
able research assistance. Wallace Huffman provided helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Evenson, Waggoner and Ruttan (1979), Ruttan (1980), Ruttan 
(1982a). This research has been recently criticized by Paseur 
and Johnson (1982). Ruttan (1982b) convincingly responds to 
their criticisms. Although he himself believes that any of the 
older studies were methodologically flawed, he argues that more 
recent studies which also show high rates of return should be 
accepted. 
2. See Rose-Ackerman (1980a) for a general discussion of the 
problematic links between efficiency and democracy, and 
Rose-Ackerman (1981) for an analysis of the link between federal 
structure and political choice. Rose-Ackerman (1980b) criti­
cizes the widely held view that a federal system will facilitate 
innovation. 
3. Consumer groups have been active in support of research on 
family economics, food technology, and related extension work at 
both the state and federal levels. They have stressed food 
additives etc. but have not been strong advocates of research 
designed to increase the productivity of farming. See Evenson 
(1982). 
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4. Nelson (1982) argues that this attempt to gain at the 
expense of competitors in other states distinguishes farming from home 
building and helps explain the greater support for research by farmers 
• I 
than building contractors. 
5. Previous work indicates that a political-economic approach 
to explaining agricultural Rand D spending is a useful one 
although these studies have also been unable to separate com­
pletely the benefits of research to farmers from their ability to 
influence politics. A study by Peterson (1966) showed that state 
· support for agricultural research was related to state income and 
population variables in the same way that total state government 
spending is related to state income and population. Guttman 
(1978) argues that interest groups supply votes to politicians 
according to (1) the politician's support for the group's inter­
est; (2) the size of the group; (3) individual demands within the 
group and (4) the level of organization of the group. A politi­
cian will demand votes from groups according to their marginal 
product in an electoral function. Guttman then finds empirical 
support for the interest group hypothesis by showing that per 
capita state support for agricultural research is related to the 
size distribution of farmers, co-op memberships, firms producing 
inputs, borrowable research and the proportion·of owner opera­
tors. Most relevant to our research is a recent paper by Huffman 
and Miranowski (1981). They also try to explain per capita state 
spending on agricultural research as a function of the importance 
of farming in the state, the state's budget, and measures of the 
benefits of research to farmers and of their ability to organize 
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for political action. The most distinctive aspect of their study is 
an attempt to measure supply side variables. Their idea is a good 
one, but the interpretation of their results is complicated by 
·. ( simultaneous equation problems. Some of their measures of the 
productivity of research spending are, in fact, also related to 
the size of the research budget and so cannot be convincingly 
used to "explain" its level. 
6. Book of the States. This number implies that districts 
containing 12% of the population could elect 50% of the legis-
. lators. In a majority rule system with two candidate races in 
each district, half the population could elect a majority of the 
legislature. Thus even with perfect apportionment just over 25% 
of the voting population of a state could elect a majority of a 
state senate or house. 
7. Book of the States and National Municipal League (1970). 
8. The regression results were: 
PCFRMRS = 0.623 + 43.41 NFT/TPY + 122.09 FPOP/TPOP 
R2(.95) (3.16) (9.83) = .79 
9. See P.L. 89-106 (August 4, 1965); P.L. 88-74 (July 22, 
1963); P.L. 87-788 (Oct. 10, 1962); P.L. 85-934 (Sept. 6, 1958); 
P.L. 352, chapter 790 (Aug. 11, 1955). 
10. Every state spent more than the required matching share on 
extension according to our estimates. For research, a few small 
states did not exceed their matching share each year. 
11. See Gramlich (1977, pp. 231-234) for a review of the litera-
ture. 
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12. The basic model was developed simultaneously by Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979). 
13. With a 50% matching rate, a one dollar increase in federal 
grants means that one dollar of state money must be used to 
satisfy the matching requirements. Thus if b is the coef-
1 
ficient on FEDRS/SB when STRS/SB is the dependent variable, then 
in the XSTRS/SB equation the coefficient on FEDRS/SB must be b2 
= b - 1. A similar condition holds for extension.1 
14. In the most recent data sets farm population is a signifi-
. cant determinant of excess research spending (Table 2). This 
result is consistent with the predicted effect of reapportionment 
discussed in the text. 
15. A shift from the minimum residual (RESFMRS = -.12) to the 
maximum residual (RESFMRS = .20) shifts the predicted research 
2share (times 10 ) by about .32. This is a large shift since 
the standard deviation of STRS/SB in this data set is .15 and of 
XSTRS/SB, .11. 
16. This result does not carry over into recent years when we 
have a measure of RESFMRS. 
17. The difference between research and extension may reflect 
the lower fungibility of extension spending. If federal funding 
is tied to particular programs at the margin it may effectively 
require some marginal matching by states. 
18. See also Table 2 where the impact of federal grants is seen 
to be stronger for both research and extension for the years 
1969, 1974, 1978. In fact, for extension, total appropriations 
increase by the entire one dollar required for matching. Since 
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the restriction, b = b - 1, must hold in every year (see note2 1 
13), the coefficients on the interaction terms APP* FEDRS/SB had to 
be equal to each other in both the STRS/SB and the XSTRS/SB equations. 
Thus if b and b
2 
are the grant coefficients in the early years,1 
then the coefficients in the later year must have the form b + k,
1 
b2 + k, where k is a constant. Then h2 + k = b1 + k - 1 holds. 
The same restriction, of course, must be imposed for extension. Some 
of our results are sensitive to the functional form used in the regre­
ssions. Appendix 2 reports results for a log-linear specification and 
compares them to the results reported here. By and large the main 
conclusions are not altered, however. 
19. Cooperative State Research Service U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Inventory of Agricultural Research. 
20. The returns may be somewhat lower in the 1970s than in the 
1950s but they continue to be relatively high. See Bredahl and 
Peterson (1976). 
